         +======================================================+
         +    i.MX8M family Encrypted Boot guide using HABv4    +
         +======================================================+

1. HABv4 Encrypted Boot process
-------------------------------

This document describes a step-by-step procedure on how to encrypt and sign a
bootloader image for i.MX8M family devices. It is assumed that the reader is
familiar with basic HAB concepts and has already closed the device, step-by-step
procedure can be found in mx8m_secure_boot.txt guide.

Details about encrypted boot can be found in application note AN12056[1] and
in the introduction_habv4.txt document.

The steps described in this document were based in i.MX8MM device, the same
concept can be applied to other i.MX8M family devices.

1.1 Understanding the encrypted flash.bin image layout
------------------------------------------------------

As described in mx8m_secure_boot.txt guide a single binary is used to boot the
device, the imx-mkimage tool combines all the input images in a FIT structure,
generating a flash.bin binary.

The encrypted boot image requires a DEK (Data Encryption Key) blob on each time
HABv4 is used to decrypt an image. The DEK blob is used as a security layer to
wrap and store the DEK off-chip using the OTPMK which is unique per device.
More details can be found in AN12056 application note.

The diagram below illustrates an encrypted flash.bin image layout:

                     +-----------------------------+
                     |                             |
                     |     *Signed HDMI/DP FW      |
                     |                             |
                     +-----------------------------+
                     |           Padding           |
  ------------------ +-----------------------------+ --------
        ^            |          IVT - SPL          |   ^
 Signed |    ------- +-----------------------------+   |
  Data  |    Enc  ^  |        u-boot-spl.bin       |   |
        |    Data |  |              +              |   |  SPL
        |         |  |           DDR FW            |   | Image
        |         |  |              +              |   |
        v         v  |       Hash of FIT FDT       |   |
  ------------------ +-----------------------------+   |
                     |      CSF - SPL + DDR FW     |   v
                     +-----------------------------+ --------
                     |           DEK Blob          |
                     +-----------------------------+
                     |           Padding           |
  ------------------ +-----------------------------+ --------
        ^ Signed ^   |          FDT - FIT          |   ^
        |   Data |   +-----------------------------+   |
 Signed |        v   |          IVT - FIT          |   |
  Data  |    ------- +-----------------------------+   |
(optional)           |          CSF - FIT          |   |
        |            +-----------------------------+   |
        v            |  IVT - FIT FDT (optional)   |   |
  ------------------ +-----------------------------+   |
                     |  CSF - FIT FDT (optional)   |   |
  ------------------ +-----------------------------+   |
                ^    |       u-boot-nodtb.bin      |   | FIT
                |    +-----------------------------+   | Image
    Signed and  |    |          u-boot.dtb         |   |
     Encrypted  |    +-----------------------------+   |
          Data  |    |        bl31.bin (ATF)       |   |
                |    +-----------------------------+   |
                v    |            OP-TEE           |   |
  ------------------ +-----------------------------+   |
                     |           DEK Blob          |   v
                     +-----------------------------+ --------
  * Only supported on i.MX8M series

1.2 Enabling the encrypted boot support in U-Boot
--------------------------------------------------

For deploying an encrypted boot image additional U-Boot tools are needed,
please be sure to have the following features enabled, this can be achieved
by following one of the methods below:

- Defconfig

  CONFIG_IMX_HAB=y
  CONFIG_FAT_WRITE=y
  CONFIG_CMD_DEKBLOB=y
  CONFIG_IMX_OPTEE_DEK_ENCAP=y
  CONFIG_CMD_PRIBLOB=y
  CONFIG_IMX_SPL_FIT_FDT_SIGNATURE=y (Optional, for FIT FDT signature only)

- Kconfig

  ARM architecture -> Support i.MX HAB features
  ARM architecture -> Support the 'dek_blob' command
  ARM architecture -> Support the set_priblob_bitfield command
  File systems -> Enable FAT filesystem support-> Enable FAT filesystem
                  write support

The U-Boot image must then be recompiled after these changes are made.

1.3 Enabling the encrypted boot support in CST
----------------------------------------------
CST version 3.0.0 and later have the encryption feature enabled by default.
If using an earlier version, the encryption feature must be explicitly
enabled.

For CST versions <3.0.0, the CST backend must be recompiled, execute the
following commands to enable encryption support in CST:

  $ sudo apt-get install libssl-dev openssl
  $ cd <CST install directory>/code/back_end/src
  $ gcc -o cst_encrypted -I ../hdr -L ../../../linux64/lib *.c
    -lfrontend -lcrypto
  $ cp cst_encrypted ../../../linux64/bin/

1.4 Building OP-TEE and ATF to support DEK blob tool
-----------------------------------------------------

The DEK blob must be created by a software running in Arm TrustZone Secure
World, the CAAM block takes into consideration the TrustZone configuration
when encapsulating the DEK and the resulting blob can be only decapsulated
by a SW running in the same configuration. As ROM code is running in ARM
TrustZone secure world we must encapsulate the blobs using OP-TEE.

- Building ATF to support OP-TEE:

  $ make PLAT=<SoC Name> SPD=opteed bl31

- Building OP-TEE to support DEK blob encapsulation:

  $ CFG_NXPCRYPT=y CFG_GEN_DEK_BLOB=y source ./scripts/nxp_build.sh <Board Name>

* OP-TEE debug logs can be enabled by adding CFG_TEE_CORE_LOG_LEVEL=4 in
  command line above.

Note: If a Make error is encountered while building ATF, make sure the compilation
environment is set up properly and then try the following command to resolve
persistent errors:

  $ unset LDFLAGS

1.5 Preparing the fit image
----------------------------

As explained in mx8m_secure_boot.txt document the imx-mkimage project is used to
combine all the images in a single flash.bin binary.

Copy all the binaries generated (U-Boot images, bl31.bin, tee.bin and Firmware)
into iMX8M directory and run the following commands according to the target
device:

- Create a dummy DEK blob:

  $ dd if=/dev/zero of=iMX8M/dek_blob_fit_dummy.bin bs=96 count=1 && sync

- Assembly flash.bin binary:

  $ make SOC=<SoC Name> flash_spl_uboot

The mkimage log will be used during the encrypted boot procedure to create the
Command Sequence File (CSF):

- imx-mkimage build log:

  Loader IMAGE:
   header_image_off 	0x0
   dcd_off 		0x0
   image_off 		0x40
   csf_off 		0x2c400
   spl hab block: 	0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x2c400

  Second Loader IMAGE:
   sld_header_off 	0x57c00
   sld_csf_off 		0x58c20
   sld hab block:   0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x1020
   fit-fdt csf_off     0x5ac20
   fit-fdt hab block:  0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x3020

- Additional HAB information is provided by running the following command:

  $ make SOC=<SoC Name> print_fit_hab

  ./../scripts/pad_image.sh bl31.bin
  ./../scripts/pad_image.sh u-boot-nodtb.bin fsl-imx8mm-evk.dtb
  TEE_LOAD_ADDR=0xbe000000 ATF_LOAD_ADDR=0x00920000 VERSION=v1 \
  ./print_fit_hab.sh 0x60000 fsl-imx8mm-evk.dtb
  0x40200000 0x5CC00 0xB0318
  0x402B0318 0x10CF18 0x8628
  0x920000 0x115540 0xA160
  0xBE000000 0x11F6A0 0x48520

1.6 Creating the CSF description file for SPL + DDR FW image
-------------------------------------------------------------

The CSF contains all the commands that the ROM executes during the secure boot.
These commands instruct the HAB on which memory areas of the image to
authenticate and/or decrypt, which keys to install, use, etc...

CSF examples for encrypted boot are available under
doc/imx/hab/habv4/csf_examples/ directory.

With current CST implementation is not possible to encrypt and sign an image
at the same time, hence two CSF files are required on each time HAB is used.

1.6.1 csf_spl_enc.txt
----------------------

The first CSF is used to encrypt the SPL and DDR FW images and generate the
dek_spl.bin file. The Authenticate Data command has to cover only the image
header and two commands have to be added to encrypt the image.

- Add the Authenticate Data command to only cover SPL IVT and boot data:

  For example:

  [Authenticate Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x7E0FC0 0x0 0x40 "flash.bin"

- Add the Install Secret Key command to generate the dek_spl.bin file and
  install the blob. The Blob Address depends on your image layout and can
  be calculated as following:

  For example:

  [Install Secret Key]
    ...
    Key = "dek_spl.bin"
    # Blob Address = Authenticate Start Address +  Image length + CSF Padding
    #              = 0x7E0FC0 + 0x2c400 + 0x2000 = 0x80F3C0
    Blob Address = 0x80F3C0

- Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As SPL image header
  cannot be encrypted we need to calculate the Block as following:

  Start Address = Start Address + SPL header = 0x7E0FC0 + 0x40 = 0x7E1000
  Offset = Image offset (image_off) = 0x40
  Decrypt size = Image length - SPL header = 0x2C400 - 0x40 = 0x2C3C0

  For example:

  [Decrypt Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x7E1000 0x40 0x2C3C0 "flash-spl-enc.bin"

1.6.2 csf_spl_sign_enc.txt
---------------------------

The second CSF is used to sign the encrypted SPL image previously generated
(flash-spl-enc.bin).

- The Authenticate Data command should cover the entire SPL and DDR FW image,
  the file parameter is the encrypted image flash-spl-enc.bin:

  For example:

  [Authenticate Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x7E0FC0 0x0 0x2C400 "flash-spl-enc.bin"

- Add the Install Secret Key command to generate a dummy DEK blob file,
  the blob address should be the same as used in csf_spl_enc.txt:

  For example:

  [Install Secret Key]
    ...
    Key = "dek_spl_dummy.bin"
    Blob Address = 0x80F3C0

- Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As image was encrypted
  in CSF above we need to encrypt a dummy file, the block addresses should be
  the same as used in csf_spl_enc.txt:

  For example:

  [Decrypt Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x7E1000 0x40 0x2C3C0 "flash-spl-enc-dummy.bin"

1.7 Encrypting and signing the SPL + DDR FW image
--------------------------------------------------

The CST is used to encrypt the image and regenerate a random DEK. During this
step two CSF binaries are generated but only one will be included in final
image.

- Encrypt the SPL + DDR FW image:

  $ cp flash.bin flash-spl-enc.bin
  $ ./cst_encrypted -i csf_spl_enc.txt -o csf_spl_enc.bin

- Sign the encrypted SPL + DDR FW image:

  $ cp flash-spl-enc.bin flash-spl-enc-dummy.bin
  $ ./cst_encrypted -i csf_spl_sign_enc.txt -o csf_spl_sign_enc.bin

1.7.1 Create final CSF binary for SPL + DDR FW image
-----------------------------------------------------

As only one CSF binary will be included in final image it's necessary to
swap Nonce/MAC from csf_spl_enc.bin to csf_spl_sign_enc.bin.

- Calculate Nonce/MAC size based on MAC bytes value in CSF:

  Nonce/MAC size = Nonce size + MAC bytes + CSF header for Nonce/Mac
                 = 12 + 16 + 8 = 36 bytes

- Calculate Nonce/MAC offset in CSF:

  MAC offset = csf_spl_enc.bin size - Nonce/MAC size
             = 3980 - 36 = 3944 Bytes

- Extract Nonce/MAC from csf_spl_enc.bin:

  $ dd if=csf_spl_enc.bin of=noncemac.bin bs=1 skip=3944 count=36

- Replace the MAC of csf_spl_sign_enc with the one extracted above:

  $ dd if=noncemac.bin of=csf_spl_sign_enc.bin bs=1 seek=3944 count=36

1.8 Creating the CSF description file for FIT image
----------------------------------------------------

Similar to SPL image two CSF files are required encrypt and sign the FIT
image.

Please note that the steps below are using the flash-spl-enc.bin image created
in steps above.

1.8.1 csf_fit_enc.txt
----------------------

The first CSF is used to encrypt the FIT image and generate the dek_fit.bin
file.

- Modify the Authenticate Data command to only cover FIT image FDT header:

  For example:

  [Authenticate Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x401FADC0 0x57C00 0x1020 "flash-spl-enc.bin"

- Add the Install Secret Key command to generate the dek_fit.bin file and
  install the blob. The Blob Address is a fixed address defined in imx-mkimage
  project in iMX8M/soc.mak file:

  iMX8M/soc.mak:
    DEK_BLOB_LOAD_ADDR = 0x40400000

  For example:

  [Install Secret Key]
    ...
    Key = "dek_fit.bin"
    Blob Address = 0x40400000

- Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file.

  The CST can only encrypt images that are 16 bytes aligned, as u-boot-nodtb.bin
  and u-boot.dtb are together 16 bytes aligned we should consider the first two
  lines provided in print_fit_hab as a single block.

  imx-mkimage output:

    0x40200000 0x5CC00 0xB0318 ──┬── Total length = 0xB0318 + 0x8628 = 0xB8940
    0x402B0318 0x10CF18 0x8628 ──┘
    0x920000 0x115540 0xA160
    0xBE000000 0x11F6A0 0x48520

  Decrypt data in csf_fit_enc.txt:

  For example:

  [Decrypt Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x40200000 0x5CC00 0xB8940 "flash-spl-fit-enc.bin", \
             0x920000 0x115540 0xA160 "flash-spl-fit-enc.bin", \
             0xBE000000 0x11F6A0 0x48520 "flash-spl-fit-enc.bin"

1.8.2 csf_fit_sign_enc.txt
---------------------------

The second CSF is used to sign the encrypted FIT image previously generated
(flash-spl-fit-enc.bin).

- The Authenticate Data command should cover the entire FIT image,
  the file parameter is the encrypted FIT image flash-spl-fit-enc.bin:

  For example:

  [Authenticate Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x1020 "flash-spl-fit-enc.bin"
	     0x40200000 0x5CC00 0xB8940 "flash-spl-fit-enc.bin", \
             0x920000 0x115540 0xA160 "flash-spl-fit-enc.bin", \
             0xBE000000 0x11F6A0 0x48520 "flash-spl-fit-enc.bin"


- Add the Install Secret Key command to generate a dummy DEK blob file,
  the blob address should be the same as used in csf_spl_enc.txt:

  For example:

  [Install Secret Key]
    ...
    Key = "dek_fit_dummy.bin"
    Blob Address = 0x40400000

- Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As image was encrypted
  in CSF above we need to encrypt a dummy file, the block address should be
  the same as used in csf_fit_enc.txt:

  For example:

  [Decrypt Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x40200000 0x5CC00 0xB8940 "flash-spl-fit-enc-dummy.bin", \
             0x920000 0x115540 0xA160"flash-spl-fit-enc-dummy.bin", \
             0xBE000000 0x11F6A0 0x48520 "flash-spl-fit-enc-dummy.bin"

1.8.3 (Optional) csf_fit_fdt.txt
---------------------------

When optional FIT FDT signature is used, user needs third CSF to sign encrypted-flash.bin
generated by 1.11.2. Because FIT FDT structure is not encrypted, so this step will not
encrypt any data.

- FIT FDT signature "Authenticate Data" addresses in flash.bin build log:

  fit-fdt hab block:  0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x3020

- "Authenticate Data" command in csf_fit_fdt.txt file:

  For example:

  [Authenticate Data]
    ...
    Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x3020 "encrypted-flash.bin"

1.9 Encrypting and signing the FIT image
-----------------------------------------

The CST is used to encrypt the image and regenerate a random DEK. During this
step two CSF binaries are generated but only one will be included in final
image.

- Encrypt the FIT image:

  $ cp flash-spl-enc.bin flash-spl-fit-enc.bin
  $ ./cst_encrypted -i csf_fit_enc.txt -o csf_fit_enc.bin

- Sign the encrypted FIT image:

  $ cp flash-spl-fit-enc.bin flash-spl-fit-enc-dummy.bin
  $ ./cst_encrypted -i csf_fit_sign_enc.txt -o csf_fit_sign_enc.bin

1.9.1 Create final CSF binary for FIT image
-----------------------------------------------------

As only one CSF binary will be included in final image it's necessary to swap
Nonce/MAC from csf_fit_enc.bin to csf_fit_sign_enc.bin.

- Calculate Nonce/MAC size based on MAC bytes value in CSF:

  Nonce/MAC size = Nonce size + MAC bytes + CSF header for Nonce/Mac
                 = 12 + 16 + 8 = 36 bytes

- Calculate Nonce/MAC offset in csf_fit_enc.bin:

  MAC offset = csf_fit_enc.bin size - Nonce/MAC size
             = 3996 - 36 = 3960 Bytes

- Extract Nonce/MAC from csf_fit_enc.bin:

  $ dd if=csf_fit_enc.bin of=noncemac.bin bs=1 skip=3960 count=36

- Calculate Nonce/MAC offset in csf_fit_sign_enc.bin:

  MAC offset = csf_fit_enc.bin size - Nonce/MAC size
             = 4020 - 36 = 3984 Bytes

- Replace the MAC of csf_fit_sign_enc.bin with the one extracted above:

  $ dd if=noncemac.bin of=csf_fit_sign_enc.bin bs=1 seek=3984 count=36

1.10 Generate the DEK Blob
---------------------------

The DEK must be encapsulated into a CAAM blob so it can be included into
the final encrypted binary. The U-Boot provides a tool called dek_blob
which is calling the CAAM implementation included in OP-TEE.  The
dek_blob tool is only functional on a board with a closed configuration.

Copy the dek_spl.bin and dek_fit.bin in SDCard FAT partition and run
the following commands from U-Boot prompt:

  => mmc list
     FSL_SDHC: 1 (SD)
     FSL_SDHC: 2
  => fatload mmc 1:1 0x40400000 dek_spl.bin
  => dek_blob 0x40400000 0x40401000 128
  => fatwrite mmc 1:1 0x40401000 dek_spl_blob.bin 0x48
  => reset
  ...
  => fatload mmc 1:1 0x40402000 dek_fit.bin
  => dek_blob 0x40402000 0x40403000 128
  => fatwrite mmc 1:1 0x40403000 dek_fit_blob.bin 0x48

In host PC copy the generated dek_spl_blob.bin and dek_fit_blob.bin to the
CST directory.

Note: Prior to OPTEE version 3.13.0, the target 8M board must be reset
between dek_blob calls, due to a known cache issue.

1.11 Assembly the encrypted image
----------------------------------

The CSF binaries generated in the steps above have to be inserted into the
encrypted image.

The CSF offsets can be obtained from the flash.bin build log:

- SPL CSF offset:

  csf_off 0x2c400

- FIT CSF offset:

  sld_csf_off 0x58c20

- (Optional) FIT FDT CSF offset:

  fit-fdt csf_off  0x5ac20

The encrypted flash.bin image can be then assembled:

- Create a flash-spl-fit-enc.bin copy:

  $ cp flash-spl-fit-enc.bin encrypted-flash.bin

1.11.1 Insert SPL CSF and DEK blob
-----------------------------------

- Insert csf_spl_sign_enc.bin in encrypted-flash.bin at 0x2c400 offset:

  $ dd if=csf_spl_sign_enc.bin of=encrypted-flash.bin seek=$((0x2c400)) bs=1 conv=notrunc

- Insert dek_spl_blob.bin in encrypted-flash.bin at 0x2c400 + 0x2000 offset:

  $ dd if=dek_spl_blob.bin of=encrypted-flash.bin seek=$((0x2e400)) bs=1 conv=notrunc

1.11.2 Insert FIT CSF and DEK blob
-----------------------------------

- Insert csf_fit_sign_enc.bin in encrypted-flash.bin at 0x58c20 offset:

  $ dd if=csf_fit_sign_enc.bin of=encrypted-flash.bin seek=$((0x58c20)) bs=1 conv=notrunc

- The DEK blob must be inserted in last image entry on FIT image, the last line
  provided by print_fit_hab taget log target can be used:

    0x40200000 0x5AC00 0xB0318
    0x402B0318 0x10AF18 0x8628
    0x920000 0x113540 0xA160
    0xBE000000 0x11D6A0 0x48520 -> Last line in print_fit_hab log

- Insert dek_fit_blob.bin encrypted-flash.bin at 0x11D6A0 + 0x48520 offset:

  $ dd if=dek_fit_blob.bin of=encrypted-flash.bin seek=$((0x165BC0)) bs=1 conv=notrunc

1.11.3 (Optional) Create and Insert FIT FDT CSF
-----------------------------------

If FIT FDT signature is used, users need to continue sign the encrypted-flash.bin
with csf_fit_fdt.txt CSF file

- Create FIT FDT CSF binary file

  $ ./cst -i csf_fit_fdt.txt -o csf_fit_fdt.bin

- Insert csf_fit_fdt.bin in encrypted-flash.bin at 0x5ac20 offset:

  $ dd if=csf_fit_fdt.bin of=encrypted-flash.bin seek=$((0x5ac20)) bs=1 conv=notrunc

1.11.4 Flash encrypted boot image
-----------------------------------

- Flash encrypted image in SDCard:

  $ sudo dd if=encrypted-flash.bin of=/dev/sd<x> bs=1K seek=33* && sync
  * Offset in i.MX8MN device is 32K.

2.0 Setting the PRIBLOB in CAAM SCFGR register
-----------------------------------------------

It is highly recommended to advance the PRIBLOB field in CAAM SCFGR register to
0x3, a command is available in U-Boot that should be called after all images in
boot flow has been decrypted by HAB:

  => set_priblob_bitfield

The PRIBLOB configuration ensures cryptographic separation of private blob
types avoiding any modification or replacement of DEK blobs. Newly created
blobs will be incompatible with blobs required to decrypt an encrypted boot
image. When the HAB later executes the command to decrypt the DEK, an
incompatible DEK blob will be detected and cause an error. A substitute
encrypted boot image will not be decrypted, and will not be executed.

References:
[1] AN12056: "Encrypted Boot on HABv4 and CAAM Enabled Devices"
